Criticism of theory and research on moral judgment is often levelled at the paucity of empirical support relating moral judgment to moral conduct (3, 16, 17) . Socialleaming theorists have argued that a distinction must be drawn between verbal values and behaviourverbal and behavioural responses being different kinds of events, the acquisition and performance of which are not necessarily related (2) . In support of their position, reference is often made to Hartshorne and May's (5) early reports that children's verbal evaluations of cheating did not relate to their actual behaviour in situations providing them with the opportunity to cheat. More recently, a number of studies employing Kohlberg's developmental stage model have demonstrated a correlational correspondence between level of moral development and moral behaviour (8, 9, 11, 15) . In explaining the discrepancy between early and more recent results, Turiel (18) Can. Psycblatr. Assoc. J. Vol. 22 (1977) knowledge test, and thus' 'their findings do not really pertain to the interdependence of reasoning and action" (p. 751).
It has become increasingly clear that distinctions are warranted between moral knowledge and moral judgment (6) . Before the issue can be resolved, however, more research is required to define the interrelationships between judgment and conduct. The study reported here began with the assumption that it was important to select a sample upon whom evidence of clear-cut moral conduct had been reasonably documented. The immediate objective of the study was to establish whether there was a discrepancy between judgment and conduct in a psychopathic sample.
The Kohlberg Developmental Sequence. During the child's cognitive development there is a characteristic socialized progression from a fear of external reprisal to an internalized sense of wrongdoing, whenever a societal law or rule is violated. This progression has been clearly demarcated in the Kohlberg developmental sequence. Kohlbergi(Z) has differentiated three levels of moral development, each of which subsumes two stages. Under ideal conditions, the child's cognitive development is paralleled by a continuing stepwise rise in his level of moral judgment until the highest stage is attained. Each stage is viewed as qualitatively distinct from the previous one, and conceptualized as "a differentiation and integration of a set of functional contents present at the prior state" (10, p.99). Moral development is not viewed as the result of direct tuition, but rather consisting of the acquisition of moral conceptual sets applicable to a variety of disparate hypothetical dilemma situations (12) .
At the preconventional level, the child orients primarily toward fulfillment of his own primary needs, morally represented as a fear of punishment (stage one) and unconditional satisfaction of personal desires (stage two). During the conventional period there is movement away from a sole concern with oneself and the beginnings of a desire to have others think well of one, represented first in the adherence to social norms (stage three) and second, by acceptance of authority (stage four). The attainment of the post-conventional level represents the highest state of moral reasoning, characterized by the self-acceptance of contractual-legalistic principles (stage five) and the development of individualized principles of co.nscience (stage six).
That the movement from a preconventional to conventional level of moral judgment is accompanied by the internalization of guilt feelings over violation of a social norm has been noted by Kohlberg (9) . Ruma and Mosher (14) demonstrated a high correspondence between both behavioural and self-report measures of guilt, and moral maturity based on the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Scale (7) . However, since all subjects in the study had attained no higher than stage three moral development, the study provided no evidence for the relationship of guilt to moral judgment for stages four, five and six.
Hypotheses
Within the context of Kohlberg's theoretical model it was reasoned that postconventional levels of moral judgment would require an ability to weigh, objectively, the information available regarding a situation, and to reach a decision that appeared most just for all parties involved without consideration of personal desires. Therefore, strong emotions such as those involving guilt might be expected to interfere with the cognitive processes required for this level of moral reasoning. It follows then that guilt feelings accompanying the violation of a social norm would inhibit persons from making judgments at postconventional levels. Thus the presence of guilt would predict the absence of postconventional reasoning.
The psychopath and moral judgment. Several investigators have sought the origins of the psychopathic personality in faulty socialization practices. Abrahamson (1) attributes the character of the psychopath to frequent changes and interruptions in homelife during the childhood years, suggesting that lack of guilt and failure to internalize social rules are due at least in part to inadequate socialization.
These signs, characteristic of psychopathy, are posited as giving the individual with this personality character an advantage over the nonpsychopath, in achieving postconventional moral judgments, since persons having psychopathic personality traits would tend to be less likely impeded by feelings of guilt which prevent them from proceeding from conventional to postconventional judgments. This proposition also accords with the clinical impression that psychopaths can frequently "rationalize their behaviour so that it appears warranted, reasonable and justified" (19, p.444).
Specifically, it was hypothesized that by way of lack of guilt feelings, psychopaths would score higher in their level of moral judgment than either of the other two groups. As this study was seen as an initial examination of the independence of moral judgment and moral conduct, no measures of guilt feelings were taken. Rather, the arguments concerning guilt were put forward as a means of tentatively explaining the results if in fact the hypothesis was confirmed.
Method
Moral judgments of a group of incarcerated psychopaths were examined in comparison to a group of individuals also incarcerated without diagnosis of psychopathy. To minimize the possibility that any observed differences in moral judgment might be due to factors other than diagnosis, data on intellectual ability, education, age, length of institutionalization, and seriousness of offence were also collected and analysed. In addition, a third group of noninstitutionalized persons was examined to help clarify differences that might be observed between the two principal groups.
Population
From a population of three hundred inmates at a maximum security hospital for the criminally insane, 16 individuals placed in the psychopathic category were randomly selected. Selection was based on three criteria: (a) psychiatric diagnosis, (b) characteristic psychopathic profiles on the MMP!t, and (c) ward behaviour based upon observations of clinical staff (psychiatrists, social workers, nurses). Because of the legal implications of being labelled' 'psychopathic" , not all individuals with the personality configuration are labelled as such -consequently the applicability of criteria (b) and (c).
Of the 16 subjects categorized as psychopathic, three were formally diagnosed "psychopathic personality", three were given diagnoses of "personality disorder", one of "behaviour disorder", one "depressive reaction" and one "antisocial personality". Those inmates not formally diagnosed "psychopathic personality" met criteria (b) and (c).
The second cohort consisted of 16 inmates who did not possess any psychopathic tendencies based on diagnosis, MMPI profiles, and clinical staff observations. Most of this group had been formally diagnosed as "paranoid schizophrenic" .
Cohorts one and two were matched on intellectual level (measured by Raven's Progressive Matrices on the W.A.I.S.). Intelligence quotients ranged from 82 to 125, with a mean I.Q. of 108.6 for the psychopathic sample and 110.6 for the nonpsychopathic group.
Seriousness of offence referring to the specific crime for which the individual was incarcerated, was assessed using a five-category scale: 1. theft, possession of a dangerous weapon, possession of narcotics (n=4); 2. major offences against property (n=3); 3. assault (n=7);4. rape or attempted rape (n=2); 5. murder or attempted murder (N = 16).
All persons included in the incarcerated sample were determined by the courts to be either unfit to stand trial, or not guilty by reasons tRosen (13) has found the MMPI to be a successful discriminator ofpsychopathy.
of "insanity" . Occupationally, 62 percent of the sample were unskilled labourers or unemployed, 18 percent were skilled labourers, and 17 percent had sales or technical skills. Three percent were professionals.
A group of sixteen attendants employed at the hospital comprised the third cohort. Only scores on the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview were obtained on this group.
Test Administration
An individual's developmental stage was determined by having him read four of the stories on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale (7), and complete corresponding sets of probe questions. Subjects were told that the exercise was voluntary and would have no bearing on the length of their stay in hospital.
Scoring. Respondents received a weighted score for each level of moral development across situations. A total moral maturity value was then computed based on the sum of the weighted percent usage at each level. All the dilemma stories employed have the same underlying rationale, higher scores indicating more advanced levels of moral judgment.
Scorers were blind to the condition to which the protocol belonged. Coding was carried out on a situation-by-situation basis rather than on a subject basis; after all the subjects' responses to the first situation were coded, responses to the second situation were coded, and so forth. To ascertain the inter-rater reliability of the scoring, 30 percent of the protocols were randomly compared for two independent raters (r= .50; p<.05). Studies providing data on the predictive validity of the Kohlberg Scale report moderate to high effectiveness in distinguishing individuals at the various stages of moral reasoning (4, 14) .
Results
No statistical differences were obtained between the two incarcerated groups on measures of seriousness of offence, age, length of institutionalization, education, and intelligence.
One-way analysis of variance on moral judgment scores indicates a highly significant difference across the three groups (F=8.45; df= 2/38; p<.Ol). In terms of modal stage scores for each of the first five developmental levels, most psychopaths fell within the upper limits of the conventional range; psychopaths produced 36 percent more stage 5 (postconventional) responses than nonpsychopaths, and five percent more than normals.
To determine whether the Kohlberg scale demonstrated discriminant validity, product-moment correlations were performed on the measure of moral judgment and the control variables. Of the five variables considered, only age was significantly correlated with moral judgment (p<.02). This is consistent with Kohlberg (9) who also found a relationship between age and moral judgment across a larger sampling of individuals.
Discussion
The principal finding, that psychopaths achieve a high level of moral reasoning than either nonpsychopathic or attendant groups, requires careful examination in the light of a growing body of empirical data relating moral judgment and moral conduct (6) . Although the mean scores of all three cohorts fell within the conventional range, psychopaths tended to (a) respond as more morally mature and (b) produce more post-conventional responses, than either the attendants who "look after" them, or their nonpsychopathic inmate peers.
Since differences between the institutionalized groups were not confounded by differences in the social and demographic variables under study, differential responding on the Kohlberg scales can be cautiously attributed to the classification system employed (i.e., psychopaths versus nonpsychopaths). The interesting feature of this finding is that the Kohlberg measure of moral maturity lends construct validation to the diagnostic category of psychopaths. However, before generalization from the principal findings are permissible, factors possibly (non) related to high moral maturity scores of the psychopaths must be considered.
Intelligence scores showed no relationship to moral maturity level and no differences were obtained between I.Q. means for the two experimental groups.
Length of institutionalization had no relationship to moral maturity. The "regressive effects" of institutionalization that Kohlberg (9) noted in his study of delinquents was not found in this study. Three factors may account for this difference. (a) Kohlberg tested his sample prior and subsequent to institutionalization, while in this study testing was done during institutionalization. Thus it remains an empirical question as to whether all subjects underwent a comparable "regressive effect" during incarceration. (b) The settings differed. Kohlberg's study used a reformatory population, in contrast to a hospital population. (c) The Kohlberg sample was younger.
Because of the ambiguity of these findings, a comparative longitudinal study across different institutions is needed, the hypothesis being that the regressive moral maturity effect will show itself more strongly in younger institutionalized rather than older institutionalized persons, irrespective of the person's diagnostic category.
There was little relationship between Kohlberg scores and seriousness of offence (r= .29). This finding may be important in terms of the moral judgment-conduct association. Kohlberg (8) has noted that "we can only discuss morality of action when we can relate the actor's behaviour to his actual judgments of right and wrong in the situation" (p. 2). In this study, past actions were compared to subsequent moral reasoning (i.e., judgments relating to "right" and "wrong"), and the character of action, offence, was found to be unrelated to moral reasoning.
Assuming that measures of moral level contain a cognitive component representing knowledge or understanding of the content of cultural moral prescriptions (8) , then subjects operating at conventional levels are, in general, capable of conduct that is considered, culturally, as acceptable. Although the subjects of this study reflect a conventional morality, they have acted in a way that is culturally unacceptable. There are obviously other factors at work that cause a breakdown between judgment and action. Some of these factors likely relate to environmental conditions prevailing at the time the offences were committed. As suggested earlier, one likely explanation for higher Kohlberg scores in psychopaths relates to the depressing effect the presence of internalized guilt feelings may have on the moral reasoning process. That is, the absence of guilt facilitates the attainment of higher levels of moral judgment; and conversely, the presence of guilt inhibits the attainment of post-conventional moral maturity. It should be emphasized that since there was no attempt to measure guilt independently in this investigation (the diagnosis of psychopath being assumed to be an index of lack of guilt), the prediction of an absence of guilt, and a low correspondence between maturity and conduct are offered as hypotheses to be tested.
Conclusion
The results of the present study suggest that the' 'criminally insane" have a working knowledge of the moral rules governing everyday society, since both psychiatric groupings scored within the conventional range. This lends further support to the hypothesis that moral judgment and moral conduct need not necessarily be synonymous at conventional levels of moral reasoning or beyond. Further study is now required to cross-validate the present results using larger samples and a more clearly defined control group.
On the basis of present findings, it is also evident that definitions of psychopath will require re-evaluation. More importantly, if the findings of this study withstand replication, a reappraisal of traditional notions concerning the moral aspects of the adult psychopath is required. In relation to the findings reported here, we are faced with the anomaly that psychopaths are capable of relatively mature moral judgment while also being capable of committing reprehensible offences. From the point of view of clarifying diagnostic categories, the implication of the results is that an affirmation of the diagnosis of "psychopath" is to be found in their relatively high conventional level of moral judgments.
Summary
The relationship between moral conduct and moral judgment was investigated by comparing moral reasoning of a psychopathic sample from a maximum security hospital for the criminal offender with a similar inmate, nonpsychopathic sample, and a group of "normals". Psychopaths obtained significantly higher scores on the Kohlberg scale of moral judgment than either of the other groups, for whom no differences were found. Results suggest the hypothesis that lack of guilt feelings in psychopaths facilitate the achievement of higher levels of moral judgment.
Resume
On a etudie Ie rapport entre la conduite morale et Ie jugement moral, en comparant Ie raisonnement moral d'un echantillon de psychopathes d'un hopital a securite maximum pour criminels acelui d'un autre de prisonniers similaires non psychopathes et acelui d'un groupe de "normaux". Les psychopathes obtinrent des cotes significativement plus elevees sur I' echelle KOHLBERG de jugement moral, tandis que chez les deux autres groupes on ne decela aucune difference. Les resultats soulevent l'hypothese que Ie manque de sentiment de culpabilite chez les psychopathes favorise un jugement moral d'un niveau plus eleve.
